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RECIPROCITY AND SOCIAL 
OBLIGATION 
BY 
LAWRENCE C. BECKER 
I WANT to develop a tantalizing suggestion (found in 
many theories of justice) for ajustification of what might be called non-voluntary 
social obligations. 
By 'obligations' I shall mean moral (or legal) requirements. as opposed to 
mere approvals, or permissions. or recommendations. The distinguishing feature 
of requirements (obligations) is that culpable failure to fulfill them makes agents 
liable for blame, or punishment, or making restitution, or making compensation. 
Culpable failure to live up to non-obligatory ideals, on the other hand. or failure 
to realize non-obligatory values, does not carry such penalties. 
A "socia'" obligation, as I shall use the term, is one whose "intended" 
beneficiaries are all of the members of the group which imposes the obligation. 
Duties of membership are good examples. All of the members of the American 
Philosophical Association are the beneficiaries (of record) of my obligation to 
pay my dues. All the members of my family benefit from the perforn]ance of 
my familial obligations; all citizens benefit from the performance of my citi-
zenship obligations; and so forth. (Contrast , for example, the "special" obli-
gations created by a contract between two individuals.)l 
Social obligations, like memberships, are sometimes voluntarily assumed, 
and sometimes not. It is with the latter kind-the non-voluntary kind-that I 
shall be concerned. ' After all, for political philosophy, the justification of vol-
untary social obligations is just the tip of the iceberg. As applied to the duties 
of citizenship. or the family. voluntary agreements have only a limited role. 
Much more important are all those putative obligations imposed by our "un_ 
avoidable" memberships in societies, families , and states. We are usually just 
born into such groups. The memberships are unavoidable in the sense that they 
take effect automatically-before we agree to them, and usually before we even 
have the ability to recognize them for what they are. Further, they cairy with 
them a set of constraints which limits our ability to "revoke" membership. And 
they are said to impose obligations on us-obligations which we did not ask 
for, did not agree to, and often do not want. The question is, what can justify 
such obligations? 
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Three Standard Lines of Argument 
Utility, social contract, and natural rights theorists have all addressed them-
selves to the question. And the answers they provide-or rather, the justificatory 
arguments for those answers-all run into what are by now notorious difficulties. 
Utility 
At first sight, a utilitarian justification for at least some non-voluntary obli-
gations seems straightforward. Children need to be protected from harm and 
taught the skills necessary for survival and flourishing-just so that their own 
happiness as individuals will be maximized. and through that, social welfare 
maximized. Further, stable and efficient social arrangements have social utility. 
Obedience to (just) laws, keeping promises, respecting the liberty of others. and 
doing one's fair share-along with many other things-all seem 10 fall into this 
category. Non-voluntary social obligations. insofar as riley make a lIecessary 
contribution to social welfare. thus appear to be justifiable by utilitarian con-
siderations. 
The major problem, of course, is showing that social welfare requires these 
obligations. It is one thing to show that it requires the general practice of 
truthfulness, promise-keeping and so forth in the majority of the population. But 
it is quite another to show that any given individual must be truthful or faithful. 
Indeed, situations abound in which an individual's deceit or infidelity actually 
maximizes utility. Thus the sort of "obligations" justified by utility theory seem 
to be of the form "Keep your promises unless it maximizes utility not to keep 
them." And that is hardly what we ordinarily mean by an obligation . 
Contract 
Social contract theory runs into equally serious problems. At first the justi-
fication seems simple. "Actual" contracts will not explain obligations to the 
state. People, when they "come of age." do not typically "agree" to accept their 
governments in any sense which could reasonably be called voluntary. And even 
if they did, that would not give us an account of the legal obligations imposed 
on children, or the debts transferred from one generation to another. Appeals 
to "implied" contract, "tacit" consent and the like merely mask the fact that 
the notion of actual agreement is too weak to justify many of the socia l obligations 
we care most about (e.g., those toward unwanted children). 
Here hypothetical contract theory seems to save the day. If we need not worry 
about what people actually agree to, but only about what they would agree to 
(under certain conditions), then things seem easier. For example, if justifiable 
social arrangements are simply those to which rational people would agree under 
conditions of free and fair choice, then obligations which would be so agreed 
to are justifiable. And it seems plausible to think that rational contractors would 
agree to some non-voluntary social obligations-no matter whether they were 
choosing by a maximin rule or by some other (rational) rule. Thus (some) non-
voluntary obligations can be justified. 
Yet this apparently straightforward argument merely disguises the fact that the 
justification for such obligations now rests on the justifiability of hypothetical 
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contact theory per se. If it is a defensible way of justifying moral (and legal) 
obligations, then the justification of non-voluntary obligations follows easily. 
(Not surprising, for that is one of the things hypothetical contract theory was 
invented to produce.) But the soundness of hypothetical contract theory is far 
from se!!led. To the same extent , so is the bindingness of obligations justified 
only by reference to it. 
Rights Theory 
Theories of obligation which begin by giving primacy to " natural " rights-
usually a natural right to liberty-throw matters deeper into confusion. On the 
one hand there is the view that , given natural rights to life. liberty, and property, 
there is a very difficult obstacle indeed in the path of any allempt to justify non-
voluntary obligations which are nO! striclly necessary for the protection of liberty 
itself. (This is standard libertarian fare .) On the other hand. however, there are 
arguments designed to show that , on the same sort of rights theory. no such 
obstacle exists. Samuel Scheffler, for example, addresses an argument of the 
following fonn to Nozick: 
First step: Grant the point that rights are Nozickian "side-constraints" which 
define the boundaries of the morally pemlissible. Rights thus cannot be regarded 
as simply one element among the many goals of a just soc iety (such as the goals 
of social stability, economic efficiency, and a high standard of living) . Rights 
are not goals- and cannot be traded off for a beller chance at realizing (other) 
goals. Rights define the constraints under which goal realization, of any kind, 
is morally permissible.4 This is a very strong version of rights theory. 
Second step: Grant some generally agreed to, sketchy remarks about the moral 
basis of rights- namely, that their basis cannot be found in rationality alone, 
or in sentience alone, or in some obscure notion of human dignity. The moral 
basis of rights must somehow be in what is necessary for people to become and 
remain "persons" in some developed sense of that tenn . (Nozick develops it-
very brieHy- in tenns of what is required for people to "give meaning" to their 
lives. Gewinh develops it- in great detail- in tenns of what is necessary for 
rational , conative activity.)3 
Third step: Then show that the Lockean package of rights- namely, rights 
to life , liberty, and property-are not the obvious consequences of this moral 
basis. The obvious , most plausible consequence, is a right to the means necessary 
to achieve a minimum level of well-being. This is so because much more than 
mere freedom from the interference of others (i.e., "negative" liberty) is nec-
essary for having the ability to "give meaning" to life, or for being a "person." 
Some minimum of material resources, health and so on is also required . These 
requirements can be summarized as a right to the means necessary to achieve 
a minimum level of well-being. Such a right will include versions of the Lockean 
rights , of course. But it will also involve rights to "sufficient" shares of dis-
tributable goods. 6 
Fourth step: Consequently, the correlative obligations imposed on us (by each 
person's natural right to the means for well-being) will be much broader than 
those imposed by people's rights to life, liberty, and property. In particular, 
social obligations to care for unwanted children, and to obey many laws one did 
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not consent 10, and which are not strictly necessary for the protection of one's 
life, liberty, or property are likely to be justified by rights theory after all. 
The Reciprocity Argument 
1 rehearse these well-known difficulties in standard theories merely to set the 
stage for what follows. I do not mean to say that the standard theories must 
inevitably fail. Indeed, as I shall show in a moment, if they all fail to justify 
onc particular non-voluntary obligation, then the argument below fails also. But 
even granting these difficulties, I think that the reciprocity argument, as I shall 
call it, is much too powerful to deserve the neglect it suffers. This argument-
which relies on standard theories at onc crucial point- has been suggested in 
many places, including Plato's eritD. There, when Socrates is asked to justify 
his decision to submit to legal but unjust execution. he imagines a discussion 
with the Laws. Part of that discussion concerns reciprocity. The Laws say 
What complaint have you to make against us which justifies you in attempting to destroy 
us and the state? In the first place did we not bring you into exi stence? Your father 
married your mother by our aid and bcgat you . Say whether you have any objection to 
urge against those of us who regulate marriage? .. . . Or against those of us who after 
birth regulate the nurture and education of children . .. ? 
.. .. (Hel who disobeys us is ... wrong (in partl because we are the author.) of his 
education . . . 1 
Of course the Laws also give other reasons against escape: one is that in escaping 
Socrates would violate his duties as a "child" of the Laws; another is that in 
escaping he would break an implicit contract with the Laws. But I am concerned 
here only with what I take to be the genn of the following argument: the 
"reciprocity" argument. 
First step: No one is "self-made." One's existence, and individuality as a 
person, is largely due to the actions, care, and concern of others-as expressed 
through the institutions of society, the family, and the state. This premise is 
supported not only by casual reftection on ordinary experience. but by all the 
social psychological literature on the development of the self. 
Second step: People's socially fonned personalities have value for them-
both good and bad. That is, people value (e.g., take pleasure in. or suffer from) 
those personality traits, capacities, abilities, opportunities, desires, needs, and 
wants for which the actions of others are causally responsible. 
Third step: Everyone's life is a mixed blessing-and for some, the bad grossly 
outweighs the good. Nonetheless, some measure of good is virtually always 
present. 
Fourth !itep: Further, some of the good in everyone's life comes from the 
observance, by others, of putative social obligations. Everyone profits from 
freedom from the malicious actions of others, from the non-negligent conduct 
of others, and from some of their productive activities. These benefits are, in 
many cases, the result of others' fulfilling putative social obligations. 
Fifth step: Reciprocity-at least in returning good for good' to those who 
demand such a return-is a requirement of morality. This is so for the following 
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reasons. First. reciprocity is expected. and typically demanded. by people when-
ever two conditions are met: (I) when it costs them something to provide the 
benefits to us: and (2) when they cannot avoid providing us with the benefits. 
These conditions are characteristic of the performance of putative social obli-
gations. People who undertake such obligations voluntarily-by starting a fam-
ily, for example . or organizing a state-are bound to costly courses of conduct 
which are designed in part to benefit others. And people who accept the putative 
social obligations imposed by their unavoidable memberships (in families. so-
cieties , and states) likewise sacrifice some of their own interests for others. Such 
people ordinarily demand reciprocity from the people whom their actions benefit. 
Second, it is clear that the standard theories of justice will often require us 
to meet such demands. Utility will often require reciprocity (when it is demanded 
by others) just to keep social situations stable and utility at maximal levels. 
Rational contractors would surely prefer a world in which such demands were 
met (at least sometimes. under some conditions) to one which differed only in 
that such demands were never mel. And rights theory imposes correlative duties 
on us all which are, in effect, the reciprocals of the claims others may justifiably 
make on us. (Note that right holders need not exercise their rights- that is , need 
not make the demands they are entitled to make-and in some cases that releases 
us from the correlative duty. Further. when others violate our rights Itheir duties 
toward usl, we are often supposed to be entitled to punish the offenders in ways 
which, in other circumstances, would be violative of their rights. All of this 
appears to justify a requirement that we meet others' demands for reciprocity 
with respect to the perfonnance of the duties entailed by claim rights. When 
others honor our claim rights to liberty or welfare, we must honor theirs in 
return.) 
Third, it should be pointed out that it is only reciprocity which theories of 
justice require here-and not willy-nilly compliance with whatever demands 
others may make on us. Proportional return of good for good received is one 
thing. Meeting the demands of those who have given us nothing. or who have 
hanned us, or who demand things out of proportion to what they have given. 
is quite another thing. The fanner thing-the proportional return of good for 
good- is reciprocity and appears to be required by all the standard theories . The 
latter thing-the gratuitous giving of good, or the return of good for evil, or the 
return of more than was gotten-is not mere reciprocity. It is beneficence of a 
sort that most writers regard as superogatory. At least. its justification as a moral 
requirement is much more problematic than the justification of the reciprocity 
requirement. 
Finally, there is the question of when reciprocity is a moral requirement. It 
seems on the face of it that we should resist the conclusion that it is always 
required. (That is why I hedged above and said only that standard theories of 
justice require it at least sometimes.) After all, sometimes people who mean us 
harm do us a good tum by accident. Surely we don't want to say that reciprocity 
is owed to them. And I do not say that it is. But I do think that the reciprocity 
requirement applies to all cases in which people demand it in return for per-
fanning their morally justified social obligations. That is. I see no reason to 
hold otherwise if (as seems the case) we are sometimes required to reciprocate 
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for such demands. I shall offer some arguments for this position in the fonn of 
some replies to objections (below). But for now, the important point is simply 
that reciprocity is a moral requirement in some such cases. 
Sixth step: Further, reciprocity-in returning good for good-can in principle 
require compliance with the specific demands made by one's benefactors. As 
an illustration, consider the following interior monologue: 
"I made you a gift a few years ago. I know you didn't ask for it. And I didn't 
ask for anything in return. You were down on your luck and needed the money; 
I had plenty, and didn't ever expect to need your help. But now I do. . And 
returning the money won 't do me any good. It isn't what I need-any morc than 
kind words were what you needed when I gave you the money. You needed a 
favor: it happened to be money. Now I need a favor, and it happens lIot to be 
money; what I need is for you to carry out these instructions." 
Such thoughts are common when people ask others for favors in return. And 
they illustrate the point that reciprocity is not just a simple return of good "in 
kind." Rather, the kind of good which must be returned is governed by consid-
erations of fittingness (as well as proportionality) , and what counts as a "fitting" 
return is at least partly governed by the needs and wants and preferences of those 
to whom the relUm is made. There are situations in which meeting the demands 
of others (and nothing else) is precisely the sort of return of good for good which 
counts as reciprocity. Thus if reciprocity is required in those situations, meeting 
the demands is required. 
Seventh step: When others impose non-voluntary social obligations on us-
obligations to join them in producing public goods, for example-we may regard 
that (for the purposes of this argument) as their institutionalized demand for 
reciprocity. 
Eighth step: Reciprocity from us in the form of carrying out such institu-
tionalized demands-that is. such social obligations-is required (ceteris par-
ibus) If it is the fitting and proportional response to the good we have received 
from others. 
Nimh step: If carrying out a demand imposed by others is required of us , 
then the imposition of the demand (obligation) by those others is by definition 
permissible. 
Tellth step: People who have benefitted us , and to whom we owe reciprocity, 
do in fact make many demands on us---demands which take the form of putative 
social obligations. 
Therefore: Unless there is countervailing reason to the contrary, we can rea-
sonably be said to "have" at least some non-voluntary social obligations--even 
though we don't want them, didn't agree 10 them, and cannot avoid the mem-
berships which impose them. 
Types of Social Obligations 
On the question of what sorts of non-voluntary social obligations the rec-
iprocity argument justifies, due to space limitations I can only make a bare 
gesture toward an answer. The four possibilities appear to be: (I) obligations of 
restraint (such as are found in criminal law); (2) obligations of care (such as 
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exist in negligence law}, (3) obligations of effort (for example, the duty to try 
to do various things); and (4) obligations of contribution (such as the obligation 
to pay taxes). The reciprocity argument. in principle, seems well suited to dealing 
with each of the four types. 
The Distinctness of the Reciprocity Argument 
It might be wondered, however, why the reciprocity argument is put forward 
here as a distinct justification for non-voluntary obligations, since its crucial step 
(number five: the reciprocity requirement) so clearly depends on standard theories 
of justice. Those theories-utility, contract, and rights theory--either justify 
non-voluntary obligations directly, or they do not. If they do, then the reciprocity 
argument seems to add little that is new. But if the standard theories do not 
justify the obligations directly, how can they give the reciprocity argument the 
support it needs? Isn't the "reciprocity requirement," after all, just another name 
for a general, non-voluntary obligation? 
The second hom of the dilemma is the more dangerous of the two, so I shall 
take it first. The "reciprocity requirement" is a (putative) obligation, and in the 
context of my argument , it is an on-voluntary onc as well. So if the standard 
justificatory theories fail to produce any such obligations at all , then it is true 
that the reciprocity argument will not go through. But if. as I shall assume here. 
the standard theories can in principle produce at least a few non-voluntary 
obligations. then it seems plausible to suppose that reciprocity would be among 
them. This is so because reciprocity seems fundamental to the very concept of 
justice. and because the reciprocity requirement is such a minimal thing: merely 
the proportional return of good for good when such a return is demanded by 
others. As I shall argue below, the obligation applies only to the goods others 
produce by fulfilling justifiable social obligations of their own- for example, 
obligations they voluntarily assume or accept. So it is not possible for the 
reciprocity requirement to make extraordinary impositions on our tirne, energy, 
resources, and liberty. Further, it is only a fitting and proportional return that 
is required. and only when the return is "demanded" or "claimed" by the 
appropriate people. The latter stipulation provides an obvious foothold for utility 
theory (the potential breakdown of social stability if demands are not met); for 
contract theory (the "agreement' represented by such institutionalized dernands); 
and for rights theory (the "claiming" represented by the demands). In view of 
all this I shall simply assume that the standard theories can justify the reciprocity 
requirement. 
We are left. then. with the second hom of the dilemma: assuming, for the 
sake of argument, that the standard theories do not all fail. why bother to include 
all the talk about reciprocity? Such talk seems to add little that is significant. 
I think , however, that it does add enough to warrant giving the reciprocity 
argument separate status. The argument is obviously not a full-fledged theory 
of justice. But if it works-through something that is a full-fledged theory-
then it grounds sorne non-voluntary obligations firmly and directly in a social 
noml of great power and scope-a nOffil which we have reason to believe is 
universal in human societies. Q The fact that standard theories of justice support 
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this extant nonn, and through it entail the existence of non-voluntary obligations, 
is of some practical importance. 
The argument also has theoretic importance, for it helps to define the potential 
scope of non-voluntary obligations. Utility and contract theories always seem 
in danger of proving too much here-<Jf proving that we have exhaustingly 
extensive social obligations. 10 Rights theory always threatens to prove too little-
to fail to justify even minimal duties of care, effort, and contribution, for ex-
ample." But if these theories are used to justify social obligations indirectly-
by way of justifying the requirement of reciprocity-then we may have a con-
venient way of imposing the constraints we struggle to attach to utilitarian and 
contractarian accounts, and of enlarging the scope of social obligations autho-
rized by rights theory. Those would be considerable achievements. 
Objeetions and Replies" 
There are some objections to the reciprocity argument which come immedi-
ately to mind, however. And since they are serious enough to call the whole 
argument into question. I shall reply to them as a way of giving additional 
support to the main line of argument. 
Totalitarian Demands 
Objection. For one thing there is the suspicion that the argument justifies too 
much. What is to stop the state, for example. from simply overwhelming us with 
demands for reciprocity---demands which amount to the imposition of a total-
itarian form of government? Are we required to fulfill such obligations just 
because we are "in debt" to our fellow citizens? Must we do allY thing our 
"creditors" demand- no matter how repugnant or invasive of privacy? 
Reply. The answer is no. Reciprocity requires fitting and proportional returns 
of good for good. By definition, participation in injustice is not a fitting return 
of good; thus any demand, by those to whom we owe reciprocity. that we owe 
them obedience to an unjust regime must be rejected. Further, we are not required 
(by the reciprocity argument) to return good for evil. So to the extent that what 
we receive from others is the product of injustice, we owe them nothing for it-
that is. we certainly do not have an obligation. based on reciprocity, to reward 
them for their injustice. And finally. there is the matter of proportionality. De-
mands on our time, energy and wealth which are disproportionate to what we 
have received cannot justify social obligations by way of the reciprocity argu-
ment. So we need not think that the argument opens the door to totalitarian 
demands. 
Obligations to the Undeservillg 
Objection. It might be objected, however, that the argument requires us to 
repay people who benefit us only accidentally-even those who actually intend 
to harm us but through ineptness or circumstance end up helping us. Surely the 
argument should be restricted to requiring reciprocity only to those who "de-
serve" our efforts-for instance, to people who actually intend to benefit us. 
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Reply. The answer to this objection is straightforward. The reciprocity ar-
gument is suitably restricted in this regard. We owe reciprocity in the fOffil of 
fulfilling social obligations only to those who have benefitted us by way of 
fulfilling their social obligations. (Recall the fittingness and proportionality 
requirements again.) That rules out accident and unexpected benefits from ma-
levolent acts. And if our benefactors fulfilled their obligations grudgingly, then 
it seems natural to say that we owe only grudging fulfillment in return. If they 
benefitted us blindly- that is , without knowing who we were- then we owe 
only the same impersonal benefit in return. It may be that for other reasons we 
should be beneficent to those who try to injure us, or to everyone regardless of 
their attitudes toward us. But this does not follow from the reciprocity argument. 
Speculating ill Reciprocity. 13 
Objection. It still might be thought, however, that the reciprocity argument 
puts entirely too much power in the hands of others. It looks as though enter-
prising people (unasked by anyone) could build up a lot of reciprocity credits 
by simply inventing and then fulfilling all sorts of putative social obligations. 
When such people then demand a comparable return from us , it appears that the 
reciprocity argument would support them . But surely we don't want to hold that 
non-voluntary social obligations can be imposed in this way. 
Reply. The most direct reply to this objection is to point out its underlying 
assumption: that entrepreneurial manufacturing of unasked for debts is, on bal-
ance, a bad thing. (Otherwise, what is there to object to?) If so, then the 
reciprocity argument does not justify a social obligation to repay the debts-
any more than it justifies an obligation to repay those who benefit us through 
the misfiring of their malevolent intentions. Such repayments are not returns of 
good for good: they are returns of good for evii. Christian love may require 
this , but reciprocity does not. 
Overpaymellls and Balances Brought Forward 
Objection. Finally, it is necessary to say something about people who con-
tribute more than their share to social welfare-not from any auempt to profit 
from the overage, but merely because they are so talented, or so strategically 
placed, that their most ordinary efforts to reciprocate produce extraordinary 
benefits. 
Think of an inventor who, merely in an effort to fulfill a social obligation to 
do useful work, discovers a cost-efficient and ecologically sound way to convert 
solar energy to electricity. And suppose the inventor does this after only one 
year of effort (beyond the necessary education). The social benefits of the in-
vention would be enonnous-out of all proportion to the socially required annual 
contribution from one person. Suppose , in fact. we could say with some assur-
ance that the social benefits were worth two trillion times the annual contribution. 
Two important questions arise. Frist, is the inventor now exempt from any 
further social obligation to work? Second, if so, can the inventor transfer or 
transmit the unexpired portion of that exemption to others? 
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Reply. The answer to the first question depends on the nature of the social 
obligation the inventor fulfilled. If it was a continuing obligation to work-an 
obligation of effort as opposed to an obligation to make a lifetime contribution 
of a certain size to the wealth of the community-then the answer is no. The 
inventor has not overfulfilled the obligation to work. But if the obligation was 
for a fixed monetary contribution, then that obligation has been overfulfilled. 
And the ordinary rules for overpayments might be applicable here: namely, that 
we return the overage as best we can-if not in kind, then is some form of 
currency which is a more or less acceptable substitute. In the case at hand we 
can repay the inventor with weahh, with honors, with privileges , and so forth. 
The only question would be whether such repayment is '·owcd"-whether we 
owe people anything for the largess they willingly give and we gratefully receive. 
That is a difficult question in social and political philosophy, but neither the 
difficulty of it nor any conceivable answer to it is an objection to the reciprocity 
argument. 
Similarly for the question of transferring or transmitting one's "social credits." 
It has long been recognized that the concept of a property right need not include 
rights to transfer or transmitY Those elements of "full ownership" require 
special justification. So to say that it is right for people to keep what they earn 
is not (necessarily) to hold that it is right for them to sell it , or to pass it on to 
their heirs. Analogously, to say that we owe the inventor something for the 
overpayment represented by the solar energy device is not to hold that he or she 
can transfer or transmit our debt. Those rights require special justification. And 
while the question of their justification is a difficult matter, neither the difficulty 
of it nor any conceivable answer to it is an objection to the reciprocity argument. 
Conclusion 
In short, I think that the moral requirement to reciprocate- to make a fitting 
and proportional return of good for good received-yields a justification for a 
significant class of other sociaJ obligations---obligations which we may not want, 
to which we did not agree. and which we cannot avoid. Standard justificatory 
theories, working by way of the reciprocity requirement, can avoid some of the 
difficulties they run into in trying to specify the extent of non-voluntary obli-
gations. Utility and contract threaten to justify too much; rights theory too little. 
The reciprocity argument seems more balanced. Its neglect has not been a benefit 
to social and political philosophy. 
Hollins College 
Virginia 
NOTES 
lTwo subtleties lurking in this definition are worth pointing ou i. First. beneficiaries "of record" 
are those whom an obligation is designed to benefit. There are often "accidental" beneficiaries as 
well. of course . If members' dues enable an organization's cred itors to get their money. they benefit 
indirectly from a social obligation nOI specifically designed 10 benefit them al all. Second. soc ial 
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obligations are always within groups. nol across them. Otherwise, my debt to a corporation (of which 
I am not a part) would count as a social obligation. In that case it is safe (0 say that any useful 
distinction between special and social obligations would collapse. Of course, my general obligation 
to pay my debts (as opposed 10 a specific debt) may be considered a social obligation-the per-
formance of which may (but perhaps need not?) require the payment of Ihis specific debt. But that 
is distinguishable from the specific obligation to the corporation. 
zJanice Moulton's paper. "Contract Theory and Obligations without Consent" (presented at the 
Pacific Division Meetings of the APA in March. 1979) persuaded me to settle on the term "non-
voluntary"---despite its misleading contrast with a technical sense of "voluntary obligations" oc-
casionally found in legal philosophy. 
)Samuel Scheffler. "Natural Rights. Equality. and the Minimal State," Canadian Journal of Phi-
losophy 6 (1976): 59-76. 
·See Roben Nozick. Anarchy. State and Utopia (New York Basic Books , 1974): 28-35. 
lSee. respectively, Robert Nozick. op. cit., pp. 48-5 1, and Alan Gewirth, Reason alld Morality 
(Chicago. University of Chicago Press , 1978). 
oScheffier, op. cit .• page 70. Gewinh. of course. argues for such rights on exactly this basis-
Le .. on the basis of a right to well-being. See Reason alld Morality. Chaplers 2. 3. and 4. 
7Crito. at 50-51, in The Dialogues of Plato. vol. 1 (Jowett trans.). New York. Random House, 
1937. This genn of the reciprocity argument is quite commonly found in major theories of justice. 
however. as Brian Barry has pointed oul: "Justice as Reciprocity" (manuscript) . It is certainly in 
Rawls. to cite a recent example: A Theory of Justice. (Cambridge . Harvard Belknap Press. 1971). 
pp. 102 ff. And Anthony Flew even supplies a reference 10 Confucius: The Anulecu, Iranslaled and 
edited by W. E. Soothill (Taiyuanfu Shansi. Soothill, 1910) XV 5.23. The relationship to Christi-
anity's "Golden Rulc" is also evident. 
IReluming bad for bad is more problematic, as Plato shows clearly in the Republic. Book J <the 
exchange with Polcmarchus at 335). On this point. see also Joel Kidder, "Requital and Criminal 
Justice." International Philosophical Quarterly 15:255-278 (1975). 
"See. for example. Alvin Gouldner. "The Noml of Reciprocity : A Preliminary Statement," Amer-
ican Sociological Re\'iew 25: 161 -178 (1960). 
IOSee Peter Singer's discussion in "Famine, Affluence and Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 
1:229-243 (1972). 
II) have in mind the reluctance of libertarians on these mailers. 
III am indebted to Charlotte Bccker. Elizabeth Minnich. and the members of the Syracuse University 
Depanment of Philosophy (particularly Joel Kidder) , for pressing these objections. 
III owe the phrase to Joel Kidder. 
I·See Lawrence C. Becker. Properry Rights: Philosophic Foundations (London and Boston, Rout-
Icdge&KeganPaul,1977),Chaptcr2 . 
